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Adam Smith – Providing Morality 
in a Free Market Economy
kendra tully
Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) and Wealth of Nations (WN) appear to suffer from an irresolvable ten-sion: TMS extols human sympathy whereas WN extols the con-sequences of self-interest. This paper takes a comprehensive ap-
proach, adding to scholarship on what has become known as the “Adam 
Smith Problem.” Through a textual analysis of TMS and WN that focuses 
on prudence, the nature of happiness and Smith’s rhetorical style, the in-
consistency between his two texts disappears. The emphasis Smith places on 
prudence in WN can only be properly understood when one considers its 
foundations in sympathy found in TMS. By demonstrating the integral 
connection between morality and markets, Smith provides his reader with 
the means to critique educators, economists, and skeptics of capitalism.
When Adam Smith completed his two greatest texts, he could not have fore-
seen that scholars would later name the “Adam Smith problem” after an ap-
parent inconsistency in his work. Yet the “Adam Smith problem” persists, 
which comes about from a tension between his moral theory based on sym-
pathy, laid out in Theory of Moral Sentiments, and his economic theory based 
on self-interest, laid out in Wealth of Nations (hereafter, mentioned as TMS 
and WN). Sympathy and self-interest are at odds, as one is other-regarding 
and the other is self-regarding. Analyzing the connecting virtue of prudence 
dispenses with this tension and then leaves room to explore broader connec-
tions that can be made between his two texts, such as Smith’s idea of happi-
ness (which is realized through prudence) and his style of rhetoric. Some of 
Smith’s technical economic reading can be tedious, but when employing his-
torical or situational examples he encourages his audience to make moral as 
well as economic and political evaluations. One example in particular show-
cases the importance he places on morality: the characters of the agricultural 
versus manufacturing man. Drawing these conclusions about the relationship 
between these two texts shows that Smith is, in fact, very consistent and even 
more comprehensive in his works than previously thought. If then economics 
has lost its way by portraying economic actors as strictly utility maximizers, 
a reading of the two texts in this light brings a more robust understanding of 
human economic and social behavior. 
In reconciling Smith’s economic, political, and moral thought more gener-
ally, scholars use four different approaches: the political, economic, “prin-
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ciples,” and moral solution. The political approach argues that 
the moral and economic realms function if society understands 
the proper role of government and the correct interpretation of 
justice (Cohen 1989, Lieberman 2006, Long 2006, Danford 
1980). The economic solution suggests that only when eco-
nomics is properly ordered do the problems with politics and 
morality disappear (Alvey 1998, Grampp 2000). The “prin-
ciples” solution is somewhat reductionist, in that it suggests 
Smith’s economic, political, and moral realms are governed by 
one overarching principle(s) (Mehta 2006). The “moral” solu-
tion emphasizes the importance of first understanding moral-
ity, which provides the base on which politics and economics 
function (Hanley 2009, Griswold 1999). Studying TMS and 
WN, while it does not encompass all of his works, nevertheless 
allows for some preliminary conclusions about the centrality of 
morality in Smith’s thought. 
Prudence
In critical analysis of a text, one cannot deny fact, and the fact 
is that self-interest is the basis for individual economic behavior 
in WN. However, self-interest is framed as prudence, which is a 
virtue only rightly understood by also examining TMS. With-
out moral context, there is no way to connect prudence with 
sympathy, which is the basis for all morality in TMS. First, it 
will be helpful to explore self-interest in WN to understand 
why Smith believes it to be the driver of progress, and then 
to ground his understanding of prudence in his moral theory.
Smith believes that self-interest is an inherent quality in man, 
which realizes itself in economic behavior by man’s tendency to 
“truck, barter, and exchange” for their mutual advantage (WN 
I.ii.1).1 A man could produce all the means of his own sub-
sistence; he could cut his own timber to build his own house, 
he could grow all his crops, butcher his own meat, and sew 
his own clothes, but men realize the ease that can be obtained 
by relying on others for the production of these things (WN 
IV.ii.11). Smith recognizes that it is easier for one man to buy 
or trade for all the conveniences of life than attempt to create 
and provide them all himself, thus, he employs himself in some 
other way, which is not only more advantageous to himself, 
but to society as well (WN I.ii.3). Improvements and increases 
in productivity are caused by the division of labor and the in-
crease of specialization (WN I.i.1, 6). Some of these improve-
ments are the introduction of money as a means of exchange 
(WN I.iv), as well as the introduction of the manufacturing 
sector. Manufacturing is what moves society from the agricul-
tural stage to the commercial stage, “when by the improvement 
and cultivation of land the labour of one family can provide 
food for two, the labour of half the society become sufficient 
to provide food for the whole. The other half, therefore… can 
be employed in providing… the other wants and fancies of 
mankind” (WN I.xi.c.7).2 The division of labor is not a cho-
sen outcome, but an unintended consequence of that original 
principle in human nature to be self-interested, and leads to 
the industrialization and progress of society. 
Although self-interest is an inherent quality in man, Smith 
characterizes it as “prudence” and not selfishness, and there 
are lesser virtues of prudence which become apparent in com-
mercial society. Prudence rightly understood requires frugal-
ity, industry, and foresight (WN I.x.b.38, see also WN II.ii.36, 
II.iii.16). An examination of the accumulation of stock versus 
capital best exemplifies these lesser virtues. Division of labor 
allows each man to establish his own trade, but he cannot do 
so without some accumulation of stock, or capital (WN II.4). 
Smith says that the general tone of society as productive or lazy 
will be set by the proportion between capital and revenue (WN 
II.iii.13). As capital is put to use in the manufacturing and 
production of goods and revenue is not put to any productive 
use at all, capital tends toward industry and the other breeds 
idleness, and this outcome is set by the choices of the individu-
als in that society. Smith agrees that while some will give in to 
the violent “passion for present enjoyment,” most will choose 
to save, based on the “desire of bettering our condition, a desire 
which, though generally calm and dispassionate, comes with us 
from the womb, and never leaves us till we go into the grave” 
(WN II.iii.28). The accumulation of capital requires the fru-
gality to save, the industry to put what has been saved to use, 
and the foresight to know best how to direct that capital once 
it is in use. The accumulation of capital then, just as with the 
division of labor, adds to the productivity and improvement of 
society. However, just as in the case with the division of labor, it 
is not by conscious choice to improve society that men exercise 
frugality and industry but from a regard to their own well-
being. It is Smith’s “invisible hand” concept that explains how 
these private interests to augment capital lead to the overall 
promulgation of domestic business. He writes:
every individual is continually exerting himself to find 
out the most advantageous employment for whatever 
capital he can command. It is his own advantage, in-
deed, and not that of the society, which he has in view. 
But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather 
necessarily leads him to prefer that employment which 
is most advantageous to the society. (WN IV.ii.4).
However, to prove that economic self-interest has many posi-
tive unintended consequences to society is not to deny that it 
is still self-interest, which could either mean that all economic 
behavior is selfish, or that “bettering our condition” means eco-
nomic actors base their actions on sympathy.
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Smith clearly denies that economic behavior originates from 
selfishness, as he specifically states that commerce between in-
dividuals should be based on “a bond of union and friendship” 
(WN IV.iii.c.9). The other option then is to revisit Smith’s TMS 
to answer the question; is self-interest based on sympathy? Self-
interest in both TMS and WN is referred to as “prudence,” 
which is the general care an individual takes to the mainte-
nance of their health, fortune, rank and reputation (TMS 
VI.i.5). An individual’s health is easy enough to maintain, as it 
requires a proper course of diet and exercise. A person’s fortune 
is dependent on those lesser virtues of industry and frugality 
which are explicitly made reference to in TMS (TMS VI.i.11). 
It is an individual’s rank and reputation which “depend very 
much upon what… our character and conduct, or upon the 
confidence, esteem, and good-will, which these naturally excite 
in the people we live with” (TMS VI.i.4). A man who pursues 
fortune in order to distinguish himself among the ranks of men 
does so in a particular way, following all the “established deco-
rums and ceremonials of society” (TMS VI.i.10). It is only at 
that point at which he has earned the respect and approbation 
of others which Smith believes to be the “strongest of all our 
desires” (TMS VI.i.4, emphasis added). Accordingly, feelings 
of approbation come when an individual displays propriety in 
their action and an adherence to the general rules of society. 
These rules are “ultimately founded upon experience of what, 
in particular instances, our moral faculties, our natural sense of 
merit and propriety, approve, or disapprove of” (TMS III.4.8). 
How are feelings of propriety and merit established? By the 
use of sympathy; sympathy for Smith is not akin to empathy. 
Instead it is a mode by which one may enter into another’s 
situation, and in doing so exercise their moral sentiments in 
order to best make moral evaluations about the other’s behav-
ior. When the sentiments of two individuals are in concord, 
approbation follows (TMS I.i.3.1). Thus, self-interest in WN 
gains a moral foundation when connected to the virtue of pru-
dence in TMS. The tension between self-interest and sympa-
thy dissolves when one realizes that prudence is grounded on 
sympathy, in the sense that an individual’s prudent behavior is 
in accordance with “propriety,” which originates from the use 
of sympathy which forms social standards based on society’s 
moral evaluations.
Smith demonstrates that prudent behavior occasions moral 
approbation and respect. Man’s economic transactions there-
fore define his character, or at least who one wants the world 
to see, and men seem to engage in economic evaluation just 
as they engage in moral evaluation. For example, throughout 
WN Smith gives the fullest support for freedom of occupation. 
This can be seen from his extended critique of apprenticeships, 
which constrain and confine the individual in their preference 
of profession (WN I.x.c.12-16). Could this be because he sup-
ports the most liberal society? Perhaps, but it also suggests on 
a deeper level a commitment to allowing for moral self-actu-
alization. Smith observes that a man’s labor is an extension of 
himself: “the patrimony of a poor man lies in the strength and 
dexterity of his hands; and to hinder him from employing this 
strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper… is a 
plain violation of [his] most sacred property” (WN I.x.c.12). 
Only by providing for the freedom of choice does Smith allow 
men to better their condition on their own terms. A person’s 
choice of career, the sole means which one proposes to support 
themselves, seems to be the greatest economic choice of all, but 
how does one choose? Most men choose a profession which 
affords the greatest “publick admiration,” for “what are the ad-
vantages which we propose by that great purpose of human life 
which we call bettering our condition? To be observed, to be 
attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency, 
and approbation” (WN I.x.b.24, TMS I.iii.2.1). A man who 
prudently enters into any profession, and prudently conducts 
his business therefore receives all the attention and moral ap-
probation he requires. The sole motivation behind every in-
dividual’s desire to become the object of this sympathy and 
approval is happiness. Therefore, prudence, a regard to one’s 
own station and choices in life, gives him the means to find 
happiness. 
What does happiness mean for Smith? There are a few ways 
in which happiness is meant, but in all it means a sense of 
“tranquility” (TMS VI.i.12, see also TMS III.3.31). In the first 
way, happiness is economic achievement. Smith describes a 
man who has lived by the economic principles of frugality and 
industry and finally reaches a point at which “he is enabled 
gradually to relax, both in the rigour of his parsimony and in 
the severity of his application; and he feels with double satisfac-
tion this gradual increase of ease and enjoyment, from having 
felt before the hardship which attended to the want of them” 
(TMS VI.i.12). It is at this point at which all of his lifetime 
struggles are met with a just amount of reward and leisure. 
Griswold (1999, 218) characterizes Smith’s sense of happiness 
as being first consisting “in one’s being at rest in the sense of 
lacking significant discord; it is peaceful, at a deep level. Sec-
ond, happiness is more like coming to a stop than like a process 
of moving toward a goal.” In the second way, Smith’s happiness 
seems to be a sort of internal equilibrium, between how one 
wants and feels he deserves to be perceived by others and how 
others actually perceive him. Smith recognizes that happiness 
is absence of guilt and shame, and “…the chief part of hu-
man happiness arises from the consciousness of being beloved” 
(TMS I.ii.5.2). This love, however, to be satisfactory, needs 
to be deserved. A man earns self-approbation from being the 
object of praise-worthiness and not simply praise (TMS III.2). 
Thus, happiness occurs when a man does not want to alter 
either his condition, or his character.
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However lovely this portrayal of happiness may sound, the 
great irony for Smith is that men will never achieve it. Direct-
ly after Smith asserts man’s desire to “better our condition,” 
which “comes from us from the womb,” he states: “In the 
whole interval which separates these two moments [life and 
death], there is scarce perhaps a single instant in which any 
man is so perfectly and completely satisfied with his situation, 
as to be without any wish of alteration or improvement of any 
kind” (WN II.iii.28). The causes of this deviation are found 
both in WN and TMS. In WN, Smith recognizes that individu-
als want to appear as if they are doing well for themselves; that 
they are smart, hard-working, etc. As society places a monetary 
value on those items which are scarce and most valued, these 
become the objects which most believe will occasion them the 
most attention; “with the greater part of rich people, the chief 
enjoyment of riches consists in the parade of riches, which in 
their eyes is never so compleat as when they appear to possess 
those decisive marks of opulence which nobody can possess but 
themselves” (WN I.xi.c.31). Thus, “an augmentation of for-
tune is the means by which the greater part of men propose and 
wish to better their condition” (WN II.iii.28). In TMS, Smith 
states, “…the pleasures of vanity and superiority are seldom 
consistent with perfect tranquility, the principle and founda-
tion of all real and satisfactory enjoyment” (TMS III.3.31). 
For Smith, those that deem themselves praise-worthy are no 
longer seeking praise from others. There is an internal moral 
evaluation that is sufficient enough to satisfy them. Thus, it is 
a perversion of the imagination and a “corruption of our moral 
sentiments” which makes the situation of the rich more attrac-
tive than the poor (TMS I.iii.2.2, I.iii.3.1). For, “a rich man 
glories in his riches, because he feels that they naturally draw 
upon him the attention of the world, and that mankind are 
disposed to go along with him in all those agreeable emotions 
with which the advantages of his situation so readily inspire 
him” (TMS I.iii.2.1). The situation is thus a spiteful paradox; 
men may believe accumulating wealth will make them happy, 
but while striving for happiness they actually move farther 
away from it and closer to societal economic prosperity. Smith 
ardently believes “it is well that nature imposes upon us in this 
manner. It is this deception which rouses and keeps in con-
tinual motion the industry of mankind” (TMS IV.i.1.9). By 
the innate desire to “better our condition” and a perversion of 
the imagination, men are never happy because economic activ-
ity means men are never at rest, and always striving, and if ever 
attaining happiness, only doing so for a short amount of time. 
The example of the “poor man’s son” best exemplifies this para-
dox (TMS IV.i.8). A poor man’s son is born with the ambition 
to become rich, believing a palace, servants, and conveniences 
to be the best means of happiness. Thus, he spends his entire 
life in hard labor, working for men he hates and perfecting his 
manners. Finally, “in the last dregs of life” he finds that “wealth 
and greatness are mere trinkets of frivolous utility,” which are 
more trouble in attaining than they will ever be in enjoying 
(TMS IV.i.8). Although this man is industrious, and contrib-
utes much to society, from his greed and vanity he never attains 
happiness. This means of acquiring fortune does not seem to 
be in accordance with the prudence grounded on sympathy 
and virtue stated above. In the following example from WN, 
it becomes clear that however deep vanity might corrupt; it is 
the prudent and not the greedy who win in the end and who 
Smith supports. In addition, it demonstrates Smith’s concern 
over not only political and economic consequences, but moral 
consequences as well.
The Moral Rhetoric of Wealth of Nations
Understanding Smith’s style of rhetoric is essential to unlock-
ing the ends and teachings of his works. Smith differs from 
other modern philosophers in that he does not, in most cases, 
adopt a high-handed tone, but instead employs common life 
and literary examples addressed in the first and second person. 
As one example among innumerable in TMS, Smith talks of 
how men naturally sympathize with only “great sorrows,” and 
proceeds to demonstrate why this is true by asking the reader 
to take a journey of perhaps a decade within the confines of 
their imagination:
If you labour, therefore, under any signal calamity, if 
by some extraordinary misfortune you are fallen into 
poverty, into diseases, into disgrace and disappoint-
ment; even though your own fault may have been, 
in part, the occasion, yet you may generally depend 
upon the sincerest sympathy of all your friends… But 
if your misfortune is not of this dreadful kind, if you 
have only been a little baulked in your ambition, if 
you have only been jilted by your mistress, or are only 
hen-pecked by your wife, lay your account with the 
raillery of all your acquaintance. (TMS I.ii.5.4)
It seems only fit to quote the entire passage so as to convey 
Smith’s ability to captivate the reader. Smith in addition uses 
common place examples and experiences in WN. In the open-
ing pages of WN, Smith utilizes many examples to demonstrate 
the advantages and effects of the division of labor, in each case 
specifically calling on the reader to “imagine it” so as best to 
understand (WN I.i.1-11). Smith has two motives for writing 
this way: to familiarize and engage the reader, which in turn 
serves a pedagogical purpose in exercising the reader’s moral 
sentiments.
Smith often writes in the first person “I” or second person “we” 
to generate a sense of commonality and fondness, a “we are 
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all in this together” sort of spirit. This not only allows Smith 
to make his works attractive to the average layperson, but also 
to uphold his principles about the discipline of philosophy as 
well.3 Smith believes that “philosophers in particular are apt 
to cultivate with a particular fondness, as the great means of 
displaying their ingenuity, the propensity to account for all ap-
pearances from as few principles as possible” (TMS VII.ii.2.14). 
This proclivity to turn philosophy into a “system,” Smith ar-
gues, is impossible and dangerous, as a few principles cannot 
possibly account for all “the different shades and gradations of 
circumstance, character, and situation” (TMS VI.ii.2.1). The 
conversational use of “we” and “I,” and the commonplace ex-
amples seen throughout his work allow Smith to preserve the 
user-friendly feel of his moral system based on imagination and 
sympathy. In addition, it keeps readers from being scared away 
by perhaps too much philosophy. Smith recognizes that “a writ-
ten philosophical work runs particular risks of encouraging an 
‘academic’ detachment from ordinary life and of reducing ethi-
cal debate to a merely theoretical, perhaps casuistical, enter-
prise” (Griswold 1999, 62). Far from making him simple just 
because he is clear, Smith’s rhetorical style reveals his desire to 
convey extremely complicated ideas in the most approachable 
way possible.
Smith’s pedagogical motives behind his rhetorical style are 
also twofold: he wishes to encourage individuals to become 
better moral critics, to in turn then foster propriety in their 
own actions. According to his moral there, there is a desire for 
man’s imagination to fill in the gaps before engaging in a seri-
ous moral evaluation. Therefore, by way of examples, Smith 
provides the context which the imagination yearns for in order 
to help facilitate the function of sympathy in the reader. Fleis-
chacker (2004, 12-13) explains that “…since [Smith] under-
stands sympathy as an act of the imagination, rather than of 
the senses alone, imaginative writing can quite directly enliven 
or enrich our capacity for moral judgment.” The exercise of the 
moral sentiments then creates an opportunity for men to be-
come better moral critics, as “criticism is an intrinsically peda-
gogic activity” (Griswold 1999, 65). The second component to 
Smith’s pedagogical reasons for his style of rhetoric is that once 
the reader develops their capacity for moral criticism, they will 
then use this to inform their own sense of propriety. Griswold 
(1999, 49) terms Smith’s use of the second person in TMS as 
the “protreptic ‘we’:” “the pronoun is ‘protreptic’ in that it is 
intended to persuade us to view things in a certain light, to 
refine the ways in which we judge and feel, and perhaps to en-
courage us to act in a certain manner.” Depending on the out-
come of the individuals in Smith’s examples, it is a gentle way 
of encouraging a particular reaction to a given situation. For 
example, in the section in TMS on the virtue of self-command, 
Smith tells the tale of Alexander the Great, who places his trust 
in the wrong people who, after he dies, “divided his empire 
among themselves, and after having thus robbed his family 
and kindred of their inheritance, put, one after another… to 
death” (TMS VI.iii.32). Alexander enjoys being flattered and 
in power, and thus due to “excessive self-estimation,” which 
Smith cautions against here, ends up destroying his empire and 
family (TMS VI.iii.32).
Some authors focus on Smith’s use of examples in WN, but 
argue that his main goal is to clarify for the reader important 
economic principles or political roadblocks (Fleischacker 2004, 
7-26). However, it could be argued that Smith also employs ex-
amples in WN to impress moral lessons on the reader as well. 
If this is true, it means that not only does Smith use the same 
rhetoric style in TMS and WN, but they both additionally 
serve the same purpose, which is to cultivate positive, critical 
moral judgment in human behavior. Once these moral lessons 
are understood, men can then become better moral observers, 
and political and economic actors.
Agricultural vs. Mercantile Man
Smith’s characterization of the agricultural and merchant man 
best demonstrates the difference seen above between prudence 
proper and improper. By looking at these two individuals, it 
becomes possible to answer the question: what is the good life 
for Smith? Smith is not only concerned about the proper direc-
tion of prudence, but also how far that prudence will procure 
happiness. Smith’s preference is clearly for the agricultural sys-
tem, as it allows for the “natural” pattern of growth for a na-
tion, and supports “productive” labor (WN IV.ix.2, 38). Smith 
distinguishes productive from unproductive labor as being that 
which both replaces initial expenses in establishment and pro-
duces additional benefit to society (WN IV.ix.10). Farmers are 
most likely to contribute above and beyond replacing capital 
expenses, whereas manufacturers are not, thus manufacturing 
stock is “unproductive” (WN IV.ix.10). More important than 
the economic outcomes of these two systems, are the moral 
implications of both. The agricultural system is most likely to 
produce a “common character” of “liberality, frankness, and 
good fellowship,” whereas the mercantile system breeds “nar-
rowness, meanness, and a selfish disposition, averse to all so-
cial pleasure and enjoyment” (WN IV.ix.13). The “system” is 
just a reflection of the character of the individual farmers and 
merchants, who at their core are fundamentally different. The 
agricultural spirit is one of community, honesty, and generos-
ity, whereas the merchant exemplifies the “corporation spirit” 
of competition, cunning, and isolation (WN IV.ii.21). Farm-
ers, as they are spread out, are much less likely to collude for 
the purposes of establishing a monopoly, and to feel threatened 
into fierce competition with another farm leagues away. To the 
extent that farmers may begin to act this way is only a conse-
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quence of the corruptive nature of the “corporation spirit”; “It 
was probably in imitation of them, and to put themselves upon 
a level with those who, they found, were disposed to oppress 
them, that the country gentlemen and farmers of Great Britain 
so far forgot the generosity which is natural to their station, as 
to demand the exclusive privilege of supplying their country-
men” (WN IV.ii.21).
It is not only the nature of the two industries, but also the 
products of that industry which contribute to this stark con-
trast. Smith explains that as a country’s agricultural abilities 
develop, it only takes half the population to supply the entire 
subsistence of a nation, while the other half are put to work 
“satisfying the other wants and fancies of mankind” (WN 
I.xi.c.7). The nature of food is such that the amount desired by 
an individual is limited “by the narrow capacity of the human 
stomach,” whereas “the desire of the conveniences and orna-
ments of building, dress, equipage, and household furniture, 
seems to have no limit or certain boundary” (WN I.xi.c.7). 
The nature of the agriculture business is to supply the equal 
necessities of life to those who desire them, thus there really is 
no room for extravagant accumulations of profit. In contrast, 
as the mercantile business supplies the unequal conveniences 
of life to those who desire them, as long as customers who have 
the desire to acquire are alive, there is no end to the possible 
accumulation of profit. Thus, it is the inherent nature of the 
two businesses which makes merchants prone to vanity, greed, 
and improper prudence, and farmers prone to saving, industry, 
and proper prudence. The same observation is made in TMS: 
“In ease of body and peace of mind, all the different ranks of 
life are nearly upon a level, and the beggar, who suns himself 
by the side of the highway, possesses that security which kings 
are fighting for” (TMS IV.1.10). Men are equal in one respect, 
and it is only because they are unequal in a different respect 
as a consequence of the perversion of the imagination men-
tioned above that other objects become desirable. A man may 
be a beggar and still be happy if he can fill his belly, but most 
men want more than this as they believe more stuff will afford 
greater happiness.
The question becomes; which sort of life is most likely to pro-
duce happiness? In answer, Smith presents a choice:
Two different roads are presented to us, equally leading 
to the attainment of this so much desired object; the 
one, by the study of wisdom and the practice of virtue; 
the other, by the acquisition of wealth and greatness. 
Two different characters are presented to our emu-
lation; the one, of proud ambition and ostentatious 
avidity; the other, of humble modesty and equitable 
justice. Two different models, two different pictures, 
are held out to us, according to which we may fashion 
our own character and behaviour… (TMS I.iii.3.2).
As stated above, for Smith happiness is tranquility and inner 
equilibrium. From how Smith praises the life of the farmer, 
it becomes clear this life is the surest means to happiness. The 
agricultural man does not inherently have a strong desire for 
profit, and thus affords a more peaceful and less restless exis-
tence. In addition, the farmer lives in the country, away from 
the hustle and bustle of the city. Smith acknowledges that 
many men will find the life of the merchant to be most re-
warding, but it is only the “studious and careful observer” who 
recognizes the merits of the farming life (TMS I.iii.3.2). At this 
point, it becomes important to reinforce a point made earlier, 
and now confirmed by observation. For Smith, a man’s pro-
fession provides the surest means for moral self-actualization. 
Nowhere is this clearer than Smith’s praise of the agricultural 
man and censure of the mercantile man. A man’s interaction 
with the market is thus intrinsically tied to the consequences 
to his morality. Additionally, this example demonstrates how 
Smith uses his rhetorical style of characterization and situation 
to engage the reader’s sense of sympathy in order to proclaim 
judgments about economics and morality. 
The Mental Yardstick and Political Economy
The mental yardstick is a way to make judgments about the 
actions of others and oneself, by looking at what is the perfect 
standard, the minimal expectation of action, and aim some-
where in the middle (TMS I.i.5.9, VI.iii.23). If the mental 
yardstick is the culmination of Smith’s moral teaching in TMS, 
it becomes necessary to demonstrate its presence in WN to 
prove Smith is comprehensive and deliberate in his thought 
across his texts. Besides using it for personal evaluations, there 
is evidence to show that the mental yardstick can be used more 
broadly to evaluate entire systems of political economy. Smith 
compares the health of the body to that of a system of political 
economy. Doctors believe there is a perfect regimen to preserve 
a healthy body, however, experience will show that the body 
can protect and correct itself on a variety of different regimens 
(WN IV.ix.28). The body experiences its own means for self 
correction when the perfect regimen cannot be achieved (WN 
IV.ix.28). The same phenomena happens in the case of politi-
cal economy; “…in the political body, the natural effort which 
every man is continually making to better his own condition, 
is a principle of preservation capable of preventing and correct-
ing, in many respects, the bad effects of a political economy, 
in some degree both partial and oppressive” (WN IV.ix.28). 
Politicians and economists, like doctors, strive to achieve some 
perfect regimen for political economy; however, “if a nation 
would not prosper without the enjoyment of perfect liberty 
and perfect justice, there is not in the world a nation which 
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could ever have prospered” (WN IV.ix.28). Just as elements 
of the human body work to correct “sloth and intemperance,” 
human nature almost always remedies the “folly and injustice 
of man” in designing a perfect system (WN IV.ix.28). If then, 
the mental yardstick can be applied to find the appropriate po-
litical economy, this opens up questions such as: what are the 
perfect, mediocre, and worst systems of political economy for 
Smith? What are Smith’s views on the organization of political 
economy? What, then, can one learn about his views of the 
interrelationship between politics, economics, and morality by 
employing this tool?
Just as Smith supports the agricultural man over the mercantile 
man, so does he feel the same toward those systems of political 
economy which personify these characters. There are two ways 
in particular in which Smith addresses the advantages of the 
agricultural system and disadvantages of the mercantile system. 
First, is in regards to how the two societies view wealth. A sys-
tem managed by merchants views money as wealth, whereas 
a system managed by farmers believes “the wealth of nations 
[consists], not in the unconsumable riches of money, but in the 
consumable goods annually produced by the labor of society” 
(WN IV.i.1-2, IV.ix.38). The second difference is the extent of 
the overlap between economics and politics. In the mercantile 
system, merchants constantly whisper in the ears of politicians. 
The political regime becomes a gateway for merchants to per-
petuate their own policies for their own advantage, which tend 
to work against the public interest (WN IV.i.10, IV.viii.49). In 
contrast, the agricultural system has never been known to do 
any public harm and represents “perfect liberty as the only ef-
fectual expedient for rendering annual reproduction the great-
est possible, its doctrine seems to be in every respect as just as 
it is generous and liberal” (WN IV.ix.2, IV.ix.38). Despite the 
obvious merits of the one system over the other, Smith recog-
nizes that a solid system of political economy requires both 
elements and both types of people. The agricultural system is 
not sufficient for any meaningful national economic growth 
and the mercantile system does provide a means for this growth 
by opening new trade. The town and the country rely on each 
other. Just as one might employ the mental yardstick to a moral 
evaluation, it becomes possible to imagine Smith does the same 
with regards to political economy. In a realistic system of politi-
cal economy, merchants exist; however, to improve upon this 
system he suggests a political regime divorced from corporate 
influence, which will occasion high economic freedom.
Smith is extremely critical of politicians throughout WN; con-
sequently, in his improved society he assigns a very limited role 
to government. He believes it should be primarily concerned 
with defense, administration of justice (police and courts), and 
“facilitating the commerce of society” (infrastructure) (WN 
IV.ix.51, V.i.c.2). Smith argues that it is from “innumerable 
delusions” that politicians attempt to devise economic policy, 
for which they are ill equipped (WN IV.ix.51). Politicians do 
not rightly understand cause and effect, which Smith seems 
to think is fundamental to the study of economics. Only the 
establishment of “perfect justice, perfect liberty, and perfect 
equality” will bring the “highest degree of prosperity” to all 
classes of society (WN IV.ix.17). Allowing for the highest de-
gree of economic freedom, such as freedom of employment, 
thus allows for the moral self-actualization as stated previously 
in this chapter. It is only in an unregulated market that “ev-
ery man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is 
left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and 
to bring both his industry and capital into competition with 
those of any other man, or order of men” (WN IV.ix.51). This 
system of political economy forces men to accept responsibility 
for their actions, as they cannot blame it on bad regulations. 
Thus, Smith, in characterizing bankruptcy says is it the “most 
humiliating calamity” which a man can experience. To make a 
modern comparison, Smith would thus not be in favor of bank 
bail-outs, as it creates a perverse incentive for businessmen. 
Contrarily, it also allows men to enjoy the full approbation and 
respect which comes from their prudent decisions. Thus, a sys-
tem of limited government and full economic liberty leads to 
the positive reinforcement of prudence.
Conclusion
By looking at Smith’s vision of political economy, and the ar-
guments made thus far, it now becomes possible to conclude 
that Smith supports economic and political structures primar-
ily for moral reasons. This conclusion speaks to the larger con-
cern over how Smith believes politics, economics, and moral-
ity function together. It is impossible to come to a definitive 
answer without reading Smith’s whole corpus, as stated in the 
introduction, but from reading these two texts it becomes clear 
Smith places more emphasis on the moral consequences of ac-
tion. Smith’s view of society could then be synonymous with a 
sort of picture frame. The exterior framework would be sym-
pathy and the imagination, which provides the way in which 
men establish ideas of morality and virtue. Morality and virtue 
would be the “matting” under which politics and economics 
are set. Politics and economics are relegated to their own sides 
of the interior, but yet experience a lot of overlap in the middle. 
If is it true that sympathy and morality provide the founda-
tion of economics and politics for Smith, it then even becomes 
possible to assign an ideal reading of Smith. One should thus 
begin with TMS and then move to WN and his Lectures on 
Jurisprudence. Only in this way can one understand how Smith 
believes a society should be structured. 
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Although Smith is arguably the “father of modern economics,” 
he was nevertheless a professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow 
University, which means Smith was primarily concerned with 
the way in which people make decisions, and the extent to 
which they made these decisions based on some predetermined 
ideas of morality or ethics. By understanding Smith in this 
new light, it is possible he understood people to be making 
political and economic decisions through a permanent lens of 
morality. Smith would say that one cannot know the effect of 
economics and politics until one understands the cause, which 
is human moral behavior. Politics and economics do not just 
appear from the ground, but are based on decisions individuals 
make about their original formations. Whether by design or by 
accident, the origin of these political economic systems is in-
dividual action, motivated and informed by moral evaluation. 
The modern understanding of individual economic behavior 
has thus become severed from these ideas. Men are not “homo 
economicus,” “rational, calculating, and selfish,” with an “un-
limited computational capacity,” who “never makes systematic 
mistakes” (Cartwright 2011, 3). For Smith, people are closer to 
moral agents, expressing their ideas of morality through action, 
and making mistakes along the way. As stated above, Smith is 
very wary of creating anything resembling a system, which he 
believes is both naive and dangerous. However, this picture of 
society does not limit the possibilities of the outcomes. It still 
allows for the same flexibility and practicality Smith provides 
with his moral theory. With this in mind, it becomes possible 
to critique educators who divorce his thought, economists who 
ignore his moral teachings, and critics of capitalism.
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Endnotes
1. Smith’s numberings in Wealth of Nations correspond to book, then 
chapter, then part, and finally, section.
2. Smith believes there are typically four stages of societal develop-
ment: the first is the age of hunter-gatherers, the second is the age of 
shepherds, the third is the age of agriculture, and the last is the age of 
commercial society (Lieberman 2006, 225-226).
3. Parallels can actually be drawn between Smith’s style of rhetoric 
and Aristotle’s, as they try and achieve similar goals of accessibility 
and flexibility (Hanley 2009, 86-91).
